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Summary: The adoption of the responsibility to protect by the United 
Nations General Assembly marked a key milestone in the advancement 
of human security and the international protection of human rights. The 
textual adoption by the UNGA, however, was skewed in favour of the world 
order as it existed at the adoption of the Charter of the United Nations. Key 
among the recommendations downplayed by the UNGA text is the place 
of regional and sub-regional organisations in the implementation of the 
responsibility to protect. The consequence has been that sub-regional 
organisations have often been sidelined and their position on conflicts 
overlooked by the United Nations Security Council in its authorisation 
of R2P-related interventions. This article utilises the differences between 
the original R2P concept and the R2P norm adopted by the UNGA as 
well as subsequent discourses and state practice flowing from these 
differences to argue for R2P’s localisation in the African context and for 
the normative repatriation of the authority of sub-regional organisations 
to adopt coercive measures under R2P. The article uses the Economic 
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Community of West African States to illustrate the potential for sub-
regional organisations to implement R2P when accorded the requisite 
regional and international support. 
Key words: sub-regional organisations; responsibility to protect; norm 
localisation; norm repatriation; peace and security
1 Introduction
The inability of the United Nations (UN) to offer a timely and decisive 
response to avert the Rwandan genocide jolted the Organisation 
of African Unity (OAU) to acknowledge the UN’s inadequacy and 
Africa’s ‘primary responsibility to protect the lives of its citizens’.1
In respect of the response of the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) to situations of mass atrocities committed in territories of UN 
member states, a 2004 report of a UN High-Level Panel pointed out 
that the UNSC had been ‘neither very consistent nor very effective 
in dealing with these cases, very often acting too late, too hesitantly 
or not at all’.2 A similar opinion persists among African leaders whose 
common position has been the following:3
Since the General Assembly and the Security Council are often far 
from the scenes of conflicts and may not be in a position to undertake 
effectively a proper appreciation of the nature and the development of 
(internal) conflict situations, it is imperative that regional organisations, 
in areas of proximity to conflicts, are empowered to take action in this 
regard.
However, although the existence of ‘regional’ arrangements is 
permitted under chapter VIII of the Charter, the UNSC, which has 
the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace 
and security, is not obligated to utilise these for enforcement action 
(article 53(1)). Further, the prerogative of these arrangements to 
undertake enforcement action is subjected to UNSC approval, thus 
limiting their ability to act in deserving cases. Notwithstanding 
the misgivings against the UNSC highlighted above, the blueprint 
1  African Union Rwanda: The preventable genocide (2000) ch 24 para 22, https://
www.refworld.org/docid/4d1da8752.html  (accessed 8 July 2019). See also 
S  Gumedze ‘The African Union and the responsibility to protect’ (2010) 10 
African Human Rights Law Journal 140.
2 United Nations Secretary-General (UNSG) A more secure world: Our shared 
responsibility – Report of the Secretary General’s high-level panel on threats, 
challenges and change (2004) 65-66.
3 African Union The common African position on the proposed reform of the United 
Nations: The Ezulwini consensus (2005) 6.
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adopting the responsibility to protect (R2P) proceeded to reinforce 
the status quo. This, therefore, calls to question what role regional 
and sub-regional organisations have in the maintenance of regional/
sub-regional peace and security. This article seeks to answer this 
question with reference to sub-regional organisations and their 
involvement in R2P-related interventions.4 
Of all sub-regional organisations the Economic Community 
of West African States (ECOWAS) has been the pioneer in R2P-
related interventions at the sub-regional level5 having experienced 
the highest frequency of internal armed conflicts in Africa.6 
Consequently, the peace and security framework of ECOWAS has 
been termed one of the best in Africa7 and is argued to have inspired 
the African Union (AU) to replicate the same at the regional level.8 
This article, therefore, analyses the role played by ECOWAS in the 
implementation of R2P-related interventions with a view to drawing 
lessons from its interventions in The Gambia, Côte d’Ivoire and Mali 
in support of an enhanced role for sub-regional organisations in R2P 
implementation. These cases represent interventions conducted 
after the adoption of R2P at the UN level. The Gambian intervention 
represents an effective sub-regional intervention; the Côte d’Ivoire 
case brings out challenges of sub-regional intervention; while the 
Mali case represents an archetypal R2P intervention that involves 
national, sub-regional, regional and global actors working in concert 
for the protection of populations at risk. While interventions in some 
of these cases were in part motivated by a pro-democracy objective, 
their use in this article focuses primarily on the human protection 
imperative that underpinned their initiation. 
4 ‘R2P-related interventions’ is used in this article to refer to all interventions 
focused on the protection of populations at risk. This excludes interventions that 
are purely for the enforcement of democratic ideals with no underlying human 
security concerns.
5 M Belmakki African sub-regional organisations in peacekeeping and peacemaking: 
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) (2005) 3-4. 
6 B Fagbayibo ‘A politico-legal framework for integration in Africa : Exploring the 
attainability of a supranational African Union’ PhD thesis, University of Pretoria, 
2010 81. 
7 As above.
8 B Nkrumah & F Viljoen ‘Drawing lessons from ECOWAS in the implementation 
of article 4(h)’ in D Kuwali & F Viljoen (eds) Africa and the responsibility to protect: 
Article 4(h) of the African Union Constitutive Act (2014) 251.
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2 The concept and norm of the responsibility to 
protect
2.1 The concept
The R2P was first articulated by the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) which served as the 
norm entrepreneur.9 The report of the ICISS built on Deng’s initial 
conceptualisation of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’10 and presented two 
fundamental propositions.11 The first was a redefinition of sovereignty 
from ‘sovereignty as control’ to ‘sovereignty as responsibility’.12 This 
made a state’s primary sovereign responsibility that of protecting 
its population from massive violations of fundamental rights. The 
second was a proposition that where the state is unable or unwilling 
to discharge this responsibility or is itself the perpetrator, then the 
responsibility shifts to the international community which is under 
a duty to intervene to protect the populations at risk.13 Jointly, these 
two elements were presented as the core of what the ICISS termed 
the ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P concept). In its purest sense, 
therefore, the R2P concept primarily was human security centred.14
The concept encompasses three key responsibilities, namely, 
the responsibility to prevent mass atrocities by addressing causes of 
internal conflict; the responsibility to react in the event of conflict by 
intervening using appropriate means including sanctions and, where 
necessary, military force; and the responsibility to rebuild, where 
military force is used, by assisting with recovery, reconstruction and 
reconciliation.15
9 A Bellamy ‘The three pillars of the responsibility to protect’ (2005) 20 
Pensamiento Propio 40. The term ‘norm entrepreneur’ refers to an agent that 
takes the initiative to develop and promote the adoption of a normative idea. 
See A Bloomfield ‘Norm antipreneurs and theorising resistance to normative 
change’ (2016) Review of International Studies 1 3.
10 See, generally, FM Deng et al Sovereignty as responsibility: Conflict management 
in Africa (1996).
11 H Breakey The responsibility to protect and the protection of civilians in armed 
conflicts: Review and analysis (2011) 7.
12 Bellamy (n 9) 37.
13 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) The 
responsibility to protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and 
State Sovereignty (2001) XI.
14  Human security refers to security as the protection of the people as opposed to 
the protection of state apparatuses or territory (the security of the individual is 
the primary focus). See PH Liotta & T Owen ‘Why human security?’ (2006) The 
Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations 37-39. See also United 
Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 66/290 (2012) para 3.
15 ICISS (n 13) 8.
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With respect to resort to the use of military force, the ICISS 
proposed that it should only be undertaken under the right authority, 
which the UNSC was best suited to give.16 While the ICISS made 
proposals aimed at curing any mischief occasioning inaction or delay 
to act on the part of the UNSC, including proposals for constructive 
abstention17 as well as resort to the UNGA’s ‘Uniting for peace’ 
procedures,18 what is key for this article, however, is the proposal by 
ICISS that regional and sub-regional organisations could be resorted 
to under chapter VIII of the UN Charter (for authorisation) subject to 
the organisations’ seeking subsequent ratification from the UNSC.19
2.2 The norm
At the 2005 UN World Summit held at the Heads of State and 
Government level, the R2P concept was truncated and condensed 
into three paragraphs.20 These were then unanimously adopted 
as a part of a resolution of the UNGA (Summit Outcome).21 The 
postulations contained in the Summit Outcome constitute what is 
here referred to as ‘the R2P norm’. 
The R2P norm comprises three pillars: The first limits the application 
of R2P to the commission or incitement of atrocity crimes (genocide, 
war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity);22 the 
second calls for international support for states’ obligations under 
R2P; and the third requires international action to be undertaken 
through the UN.23 Specifically, the third pillar requires that where 
pacific means have proven inadequate, coercive measures should 
be adopted under chapter VII of the UN Charter and only through 
the UNSC in cooperation with relevant regional organisations where 
appropriate (optional).24
The concept as developed by the ICISS differs significantly from 
the norm as adopted in the Summit Outcome.25 For instance, 
16 ICISS 49.
17 ICISS 51.
18 ICISS The responsibility to protect: Research, bibliography, background (2001) 159: 
The Assembly is authorised under the Uniting for Peace Resolution of 1950 to 
make recommendations on enforcement action when the Security Council is 
unable to take a decision, more so as a result of veto. 
19 ICISS (n 13) 54.
20 UNGA Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 16 September 2005: 
2005 World Summit Outcome (2005) 30 paras 138-140.
21 Bellamy (n 9) 42.
22 UNGA (n 20) para 138.
23 UNGA para 139.
24 As above.
25 ICISS (n 13) 32-33; E Heinze ‘Humanitarian intervention, the responsibility to 
protect, and confused legitimacy’ (2011) 11 Human Rights and Human Welfare 
23.
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while the scope of the concept extended to situations such as state 
collapse, the norm restricted the scope to four atrocity crimes.26 
Of significance to this article, however, is that the norm makes the 
UNSC the only body mandated to authorise military intervention27 
with no mention of regional and sub-regional organisations as 
alternative sources of authority.28 This leaves open the question of 
whether these organisations can rightly undertake coercive measures 
under R2P or whether the restriction of this mandate to the UNSC is 
binding on them. 
2.2.1 The responsibility to protect norm lacks normative 
prescription
Although the R2P norm was adopted by a unanimous UNGA 
resolution and was re-affirmed by the UNSC in Resolutions 1674 of 
2006,29 1894 of 200930 and 2150 of 2014,31 it remains shrouded 
in controversy as to whether it can be termed a legal obligation 
with prescriptive force, only a political concept or just an emerging 
norm.32 Notwithstanding R2P advocates’ rhetoric of ‘consensus’, a 
genuine consensus on R2P cannot be said to exist beyond the policy 
community.33 Grave reservations, scepticism and even hostility has 
been expressed towards R2P by scholars, policy makers, practitioners, 
civil society organisations as well as by states with a colonial history.34 
Against this background, therefore, the question arises as to whether 
R2P can be said to have been established as an international norm 
with prescriptive force.
From a legal perspective, outside the confines of a convention or 
treaty, a new international norm has normative prescription, once it is 
established as a rule of customary international law having achieved 
26 ICISS (n 13) 32-33.
27 UNGA (n 20) para 139.
28 ICISS (n 13) 53; V Marusa Regional organisations and the responsibility to protect: 




30  As above.
31 http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2150.pdf (accessed 8 July 2020).
32 J Eaton ‘An emerging norm – Determining the meaning and legal status of the 
responsibility to protect’ (2011) 32 Michigan Journal of International Law 800; 
A Peters ‘The Security Council’s responsibility to protect’ (2011) 8 International 
Organisations Law Review 7; S Marks & N Cooper ‘The responsibility to protect: 
Watershed or old wine in a new bottle?’ (2010) 2 Jindal Global Law Review 115.
33 N Crossley ‘Is R2P still controversial? Continuity and change in the debate on 
“humanitarian intervention”’ (2018) 31 Cambridge Review of International Affairs 
431.
34 As above.
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constant and uniform usage by states supported by opinio juris.35 
While the unanimous adoption of R2P at the UNGA is argued to have 
demonstrated the existence of opinio juris on the need to act in cases 
of mass atrocity crimes, subsequent inconsistencies in the conduct 
of states as well as in the application of R2P takes away from any 
consideration of R2P as an international norm with any prescriptive 
force.36 In this regard, Evans argues that although R2P cannot be said 
to have attained the status of a rule of customary international law, it 
should be viewed as a new international norm on moral and political 
terms,37 neither of which has any binding force. 
With respect to the subsequent conduct of states at the UN level, 
various states are reported to have developed a ‘buyer’s remorse’ 
soon after the summit endorsement of R2P and ‘revolted’ against 
R2P with some arguing against there having been any consensus 
on the normative status of R2P.38 Consequently, states failed to 
adopt a subsequent report of the UNSG that sought to make R2P 
more prescriptive.39 Further, the UN membership is argued to have 
demonstrated a reluctance to strengthen the institutional capacity 
of the UN with respect to R2P by implicitly rejecting a proposed 
establishment of a Joint Office for Genocide Prevention and R2P by 
declining to fund the proposal;40 opposing the creation of an R2P-
related early warning unit within the UN41 as well as by approving a 
paltry 25 officers in what was expected to be a standby police force for 
R2P implementation.42 Bellamy argues that this failure to strengthen 
the institutional capacity of the UN demonstrates the backtracking 
of states in their commitment, thus eroding the consensus on R2P.43
With regard to how R2P has been applied in actual cases, Deitelhoff 
and Zimmerman argue that its role has been ‘ambivalent at best’ and 
that it has been used to further private interests but ignored in real 
crises, hence its application is crippled by selectivity and hypocrisy.44 
This has been reflected in the invocation and application of R2P 
35 MN Shaw International law (2008) 75-76; Eaton (n 32) 767.
36 Eaton (n 32) 801; S Africa & R Pretorius ‘South Africa, the African Union and the 
responsibility to protect: The case of Libya’ (2012) 12 African Human Rights Law 
Journal 398.
37 G Evans ‘R2P: The next ten years’ in AJ Bellamy & T Dunne (eds) The Oxford 
handbook on the responsibility to protect (2016) 4.
38 G Evans ‘The responsibility to protect: An idea whose time has come … 
and gone?’ (2008) 22 International Relations 288; AJ Bellamy ‘Realising the 
responsibility to protect’ (2009) 10 International Studies Perspectives 112.
39 Eaton (n 32) 800.
40 Evans (n 38) 288.
41 Bellamy (n 38) 112.
42 As above.
43 As above.
44 N Deitelhoff & L Zimmermann Things we lost in the fire: How different types of 
contestation affect the validity of international norms (2013) 7.
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(or lack thereof) in the cases of Georgia, Myanmar, Burma, Libya 
and Syria, thus significantly impacting any notions of R2P having 
any normative force with respect to uniformity, objectivity and 
consistency in its application.45 The above arguments demonstrate 
that R2P cannot be termed a norm in legal terms but rather an 
evolutionary norm in need of consolidation through consistent state 
practice.46
From the perspective of international norm dynamics studies 
(on the diffusion of transnational norms), R2P is yet to evolve into 
an international norm. This requires the norm to have undergone 
three stages of what Finnemore and Sikkink refer to as the life cycle 
of a norm (emergence, norm cascade and internalisation).47 From 
this perspective, the adoption of R2P by the UNGA established the 
critical mass support required for it to be said to have emerged as 
an international norm.48 To be internalised, a norm requires to have 
acquired a taken-for-granted quality ‘that makes conformance with 
the norm almost automatic’.49 The arguments proffered above on 
R2P’s want of usage rule out any possibility of R2P having been 
internalised, thereby leaving R2P in the norm cascade stage. 
What happens at the norm cascade stage depends on whether 
one ascribes to the constructivist or the critical approach to norm 
diffusion. For constructivists, the second stage is a linear and conflict-
free ‘norm acceptance’ stage, hence they expect a dichotomous 
outcome of either acceptance or rejection of the norm which itself 
remains static.50 Acharya criticises this view as engaging in ‘moral 
proselytism’ which presents ‘global’ norms as inherently good and 
regional or sub-regional norms as innately bad, hence viewing 
any form of normative contestation51 as illegitimate.52 Critical 
approaches, however, view a norm as being dynamic throughout 
the norm cascade stage and emphasise the agency role of ‘norm 
45 Crossley (n 33) 420; J Sarkin ‘The role of the United Nations, the African Union 
and Africa’s sub-regional organisations in dealing with Africa’s human rights 
problems: Connecting humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to 
protect’ (2009) 53 Journal of African Law 31 
46 S Gagro ‘The responsibility to protect (R2P) doctrine’ (2014) III International 
Journal of Social Sciences 74; Deitelhoff & Zimmermann (n 44) 7.
47 M Finnemore & K Sikkink ‘International norm dynamics and political change’ 
(1998) 52 International Organisation 892.
48 Deitelhoff & Zimmermann (n 44) 7.
49 Finnemore & Sikkink (n 47) 895.
50 Bloomfield (n 9) 4; Deitelhoff & Zimmermann (n 44) 1-2. 
51 Contestation refers to the emergence of differences about the right interpretation 
and application or about the validity of a norm. See Deitelhoff & Zimmermann 
(n 44) 1-18.
52 A Acharya ‘How ideas spread: Whose norms matter? Norm localisation and 
institutional change in Asian regionalism’ (2004) 58 International Organisation 
242.
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takers’, thus opening up the norm to contestation and change.53 In 
the latter view, therefore, norm localisation54 is presented as being 
critical in building normative congruence and, thus, helping to settle 
most cases of normative contestation.55 This article adopts a critical 
approach in its analysis and argues that R2P is currently undergoing 
contestation, hence providing room for localisation.
Wiener argues that often, as is the case herein, the contestation 
involves the legitimacy of ‘standardised procedures’ for implementing 
norms (what Welsh refers to as procedural contestation)56 and 
that such contestation is necessary for the regularisation of such 
procedures to strengthen the norm and for legitimacy.57 Contestation 
with respect to R2P surrounds the procedure on how it should be 
implemented under the third pillar58 and specifically, herein, whether 
regional and sub-regional organisations have the right to adopt 
coercive measures.
A key factor in norm contestation is the realisation that new 
norms do not seek application in a vacuum, hence they have to 
contend with legitimate pre-existing domestic normative, social and 
institutional orders.59 Key in this respect, therefore, is any normative 
orders for regional and sub-regional intervention that were in 
existence prior to the emergence of R2P (cognitive priors).60 The AU 
as well as sub-regional organisations (ECOWAS) had already adopted 
indigenous normative frameworks that allowed them to intervene in 
the territory of their members for human protection purposes way 
before the emergence of R2P.61 The implementation of R2P after its 
emergence, therefore, provided an opportunity for its localisation 
so as to ensure congruence with these pre-existing orders62 that 
53 Acharya (n 52) 241; R Madokoro ‘International commissions as norm 
entrepreneurs: Creating the normative idea of the responsibility to protect’ 
(2019) 45 Review of International Studies 102.
54 Norm localisation refers to the reconstruction of foreign norms to tailor these to 
prevailing local traditions (cognitive priors) and identities (including collective 
identities). See Acharya (n 52) 239-240.
55 Acharya (n 52) 239.
56 J Welsh ‘Norm contestation and the responsibility to protect’ (2013) 5 Global 
Responsibility to Protect 365. 
57 Bloomfield (n 9) 6; Deitelhoff & Zimmermann (n 44) 1.
58 J Welsh ‘Norm robustness and the responsibility to protect’ (2019) 4 Journal of 
Global Security Studies 53.
59 Acharya (n 52) 241; TR Eimer, S Lutz & V Schuren ‘Varieties of localisation: 
International norms and the commodification of knowledge in India and Brazil’ 
(2016) 23 Review of International Political Economy 451.
60 Acharya (n 52) 239-240.
61 A Acharya ‘The R2P and norm diffusion: Towards a framework of norm 
circulation’ (2013) 5 Global Responsibility to Protect 478; Evans (n 38) 289; A Alao 
The role of African regional and sub-regional organisations in conflict prevention and 
resolution (2000) 3-4.
62 Eimer, Lutz & Schuren (n 59) 451.
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had arguably proven to be efficacious and were already considered 
legitimate in their pre-existing normative communities.63 
3 The place of sub-regional organisations in the 
implementation of the responsibility to protect
Regional and sub-regional organisations continue to play an ever-
increasing role as front-line responders to mass atrocity crimes, more 
so in Africa.64 In this respect, Bellamy and Williams acknowledge 
that some regional organisations have actually become ‘important 
peacekeepers in their own right’.65 They also point out that a strong 
partnership between the UNSC and regional (as well as sub-regional) 
organisations is crucial in guaranteeing effective responses to human 
protection crises.66 However, the persisting question is whether the 
nature of this ‘partnership’ ought to allow sub-regional organisations 
to undertake coercive measures under R2P.
The ICISS pondered over the issue in the following terms:67
In the mid-1940s, regional organisations were unquestionably 
subordinated to the authority of the UNSC. At the turn of the century, 
it is less certain whether the text of the Charter remains definitive on 
the issue of regional authority. Specifically, there are questions as to 
whether regional [and sub-regional] enforcement action under all 
circumstances continues to fall under the subordinate status of the 
UNSC covered by Article 53(1).
The ICISS argued that the UN Charter ‘is a living instrument that 
has evolved over the years and will continue to do so’, hence ‘a 
literal reading of the Charter is no longer an accurate reflection of 
contemporary international law’.68 
63 Bloomfield (n 9) 8; UNSG The role of regional and sub-regional arrangements in 
implementing the responsibility to protect: Report of the Secretary-General (2011) 
3 para 6. In this report the UNSG argued for norm localisation stating that the 
implementation of R2P should ‘respect institutional and cultural differences from 
region to region’ and that these regions are open to operationalise the principle 
in their own way.
64 Evans (n 37) 12; V Adetula, R Bereketeab & O Jaiyebo Regional economic 
communities and peacebuilding in Africa:The experiences of ECOWAS and IGAD 
(2016) 7 38; Alao (n 61) 3 10; B Bojang ‘Protection of civilians in armed conflicts 
in West Africa’ in D Kuwali & F Viljoen (eds) By all means necessary: Protecting 
civilians and preventing mass atrocities in Africa (2017) 321.
65 AJ Bellamy & PD Williams ‘The new politics of protection? Côte d’Ivoire, Libya 
and the responsibility to protect’ (2011) 87 International Affairs (Royal Institute of 
International Affairs) 826.
66 Bellamy & Williams (n 65) 848.
67 ICISS (n 18) 168.
68 ICISS 170.
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The UNSG, for its part, in its 2009 report to the UNGA pointed 
out that the UNSC has primary and not total responsibility for the 
maintenance of peace and security.69 It added that some crimes under 
R2P may not necessarily be deemed to pose a threat to international 
peace and security such as to fall right within the UNSC’s purview.70 
The UNSG, therefore, urged better modes of collaboration between 
the UN and regional as well as sub-regional arrangements and 
emphasised that this new collaboration ought to consider and be 
based on capacity sharing and not merely capacity building.71 
The above essentially called for a rethinking of the relationship 
between the UNSC and regional as well as sub-regional organisations, 
with respect to the authority to impose coercive measures under R2P 
with the emphasis on the need to acknowledge the authority of 
regional and sub-regional organisations.
3.1 Interpretative approaches to sub-regional authority
Given the persisting need to place coercive measures by sub-regional 
organisations under R2P within the prevailing UN system, resort has 
been had to interpreting the requirement for UNSC authorisation in 
a manner that permits action by sub-regional organisations. This has 
given rise to two schools of thought around the temporal essence of 
the requirement: those that insist on the UNSC’s approval prior to 
intervention (‘green light’ interpretation); and those that argue for 
intervention to proceed unless the UNSC specifically votes to halt it 
(‘red light’ interpretation).72 
The red light interpretation picks up from the UNSG’s argument 
above that although the UNSC has the primary mandate to approve 
military interventions, such mandate is not exclusive.73 Gagro argues 
that from state practice, even though the UNSC authorisation is most 
desirable, it no longer is regarded by the international community 
as an absolute must.74 As an alternative, Gagro paints a picture of 
a legitimacy ladder at the top of which sits the UNSC. She argues 
that states show respect for this legitimacy ladder when considering 
intervention and have always climbed the necessary stairs in their 
respective circumstances. She then presents regional (including sub-
regional) organisations as the second best authority which is lower in 
69 UNSG Implementing the responsibility to protect: Report of the Secretary-General 
(2009) 27 para 63.
70 As above.
71 UNSG (n 69) para 65.
72 ICISS (n 18) 170.
73 Gagro (n 46) 67.
74 Gagro 68.
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the ladder and hence more accessible and preferable in authorising 
and effecting coercive measures under R2P.75
Further support for the red light interpretation is found in the 
ICISS report where the Commission pointed out that recent practice 
showed that UNSC’s approval could be sought ex post facto.76 
Examples given in that respect included the interventions undertaken 
by ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone which were retroactively 
sanctioned by the UNSC through Resolutions 788 of 1992 and 1132 
of 1997 respectively. These, among other regional examples, have 
even been argued as providing evidence that intervention without 
UNSC authorisation is an emerging legal custom.77 
The UN High-Level Panel as well as the AU supported the idea that 
approval could be sought after the fact.78 However, they qualified 
this as being applicable only in urgent cases. While the AU does 
not provide temporal specifications, the High-Level Panel proposed 
that authorisation should be sought after commencement of the 
intervention.79
It is, however, argued in support of the green light interpretation 
that intervention without prior approval of the UNSC poses the risk 
of ‘undermining the imperfect, yet resilient, security system created 
after the Second World War (WWII) and setting dangerous precedents 
for future interventions’.80 This argument, however, fails to consider, 
among other factors, the need to adapt World War II-old systems to 
prevailing realities regarding the organisation of states and attendant 
security dynamics adopted at regional and sub-regional levels.81
3.2 Legitimacy as a basis for sub-regional authority
Alongside the interpretative arguments above lie arguments that 
place primacy on the legitimacy of sub-regional intervention 
regardless of any ‘illegality’ that may arise from a failure to obtain 
prior UNSC approval. The ICISS argued that ‘in the blurred area 
where international custom is evolving or unclear, the notion of 
75 As above.
76 ICISS (n 13) 54.
77 ICISS (n 18) 166.
78 UNSG (n 2) 85; AU (n 3) 6.
79 As above.
80 Bellamy (n 9) 40.
81 P Arthur ‘Promoting security in Africa through regional economic communities 
(RECs) and the African Union’s African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)’ 
(2017) 9 Insight on Africa 2. Other contentious issues against the system include 
the continued structuring of veto powers based on World War II power dynamics. 
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legitimacy takes on greater significance’.82 To echo this position, the 
High-Level Panel stated:83
The effectiveness of the global collective security system … depends 
ultimately not only on the legality of decisions but also on the common 
perception of their legitimacy – their being made on solid evidentiary 
grounds and for the right reasons, morally as well as legally.
In this respect, the intervention by the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO) in Kosovo in 1999, for instance, was found 
to be ‘illegal but legitimate’ thus ensuring a victory for NATO when 
a resolution was presented in the UNSC seeking to declare its 
intervention a violation of international law.84  Increasingly, therefore, 
some decisions about intervention may require the use of force 
without UNSC approval and the merits of each case will determine 
the legitimacy of such interventions.85
To ensure that interventions are legitimate, regional and sub-
regional organisations therefore need to ascertain that there is an 
objectively-perceived or actual humanitarian situation; undertake 
and demonstrate that reasonable efforts to reach a diplomatic or 
peaceful resolution have failed; and comply with the requirements 
of international humanitarian law in the conduct of their military 
interventions.86 The sustainability of the protection measures adopted 
will also serve to legitimise such interventions. Also, the presence of 
a treaty instrument ratified by the subject state and bestowing on 
the regional or sub-regional organisation the right to intervene for 
human protection purposes will also serve as a critical legitimising 
tool.87 Moreover, this serves as proof of grant of anticipatory consent 
to the intervening regional or sub-regional organisation. 
The above arguments, therefore, make a strong case for the 
authority of regional and sub-regional organisations to undertake 
coercive measures under R2P in their own right to ensure the 
protection of populations at risk. Besides, the human protection 
imperative should always bend towards saving lives rather than to 
the prizing of anachronistic procedural hurdles.88
82 ICISS (n 18) 170.
83 UNSG (n 2) 66; G Evans ‘From humanitarian intervention to the responsibility to 
protect’ (2006) 3 Wisconsin International Law Journal 710.
84 Draft UNSC Resolution, UN Doc S/1999/328 (26 March 1999); ICISS (n 18) 
166-168.
85 Bellamy (n 38) 125.
86 ICISS (n 18) 170.
87 As above.
88 UNSG (n 69) 19 para 50.
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3.3 The comparative advantage of sub-regional organisations 
The ICISS acknowledged that neighbouring countries in the context 
of regional and sub-regional arrangements often have comparative 
advantages that make them better placed to take action in response 
to conflict than the UN.89
To begin with, internal conflicts in states always tend to have 
negative spill-over effects, such as the inflow of refugees, which 
significantly impact neighbouring countries.90 Second, conflict in 
one country always tends to spark related or resultant conflicts in 
neighbouring states. For instance, ‘international terrorist groups 
prey on weak states for sanctuary’, thereby posing security threats 
to neighbouring countries.91 Third, the close proximity of states 
within sub-regional organisations gives them a better appreciation 
of a conflict’s dynamics, hence equipping them with knowledge on 
where and how to effect intervention measures.92 Lastly, the sharing 
of borders, joint regional institutions and trade makes sub-regional 
organisations better placed to effect economic sanctions imposed 
on countries experiencing conflict.93 Sub-regional organisations’ 
involvement in their formulation therefore assures their commitment 
to ensure that they are not breached.
The above factors give neighbouring states in sub-regional 
organisations (even more that regional organisations) a strong 
collective interest in swiftly and effectively putting an end to R2P-
related conflicts. This interest, moreover, is sufficient to mobilise 
the necessary political will not only to act but to also to ensure 
the sustainability of the specific measures adopted in resolving the 
conflicts.94 
89 ICISS (n 13) 53.
90 As above; T Kabau ‘The responsibility to protect and the role of regional 
organisations: An appraisal of the African Union’s interventions’ (2012) 4 
Goettingen Journal of International Law 57.
91 UNSG (n 2) 14.
92 UNSG (n 69) 7; T Ajayi The UN, the AU and ECOWAS – A triangle for peace and 
security in West Africa? (2008) 8.
93 UNSG (n 69) 11.
94 ICISS (n 13) 54; UNSG A vital and enduring commitment: Implementing the 
responsibility to protect: Report of the Secretary-General (2015).
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4 Implementation of the responsibility to protect in 
ECOWAS: Lessons from sub-regional intervention 
ECOWAS was established under the Treaty of Lagos in 1975 and is 
currently made up of 15 states.95 It has established various institutions 
that play different roles in the implementation of decisions that 
ideally fall under R2P. These include the Authority of Heads of State 
and Government (ECOWAS Authority) which is the highest decision-
making body on peace and security matters;96 the Mediation and 
Security Council (MSC) which takes all decisions on peace and security 
matters upon delegation from the ECOWAS Authority;97 the Council 
of Elders who use their good offices to pursue pacific settlement of 
disputes;98 and the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) which is 
a stand-by military force and an early warning mechanism referred 
to as the Monitoring and Observation Centre.99
ECOWAS is highly supranational, a factor that has largely 
contributed to the success of its decisions on peace and security.100 
Its decisional supra-nationalism that allows it to utilise a majority-
based decision-making process101 as opposed to a consensus-based 
process has been critical in ensuring timely and decisive action.102 
The democratic density103 of ECOWAS is also a key facilitator of its 
effectiveness.
4.1 How the ECOWAS framework supports R2P 
implementation 
Although largely put in place long before the emergence of R2P, the 
ECOWAS framework provides a sound basis for R2P implementation. 
This part examines how the framework provides room for the 
implementation of R2P’s three core responsibilities.
95 http://www.ecowas.int/about-ecowas/basic-information/ (accessed 8 July 
2020): Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal, Mali, Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, The Gambia, 
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone, Niger, Cape Verde, Burkina Faso, Benin 
and Togo.
96 1999 ECOWAS Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, 
Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security (Protocol on the ECOWAS 
Mechanism (PEM)) art 6.
97 PEM (n 96) arts 4 & 10.
98 PEM art 17.
99 Revised Treaty art 58.
100 Adetula, Bereketeab & Jaiyebo (n 64) 22.
101 Art 9(4) of Revised Treaty as read with art 9 of the PEM allows only four in a 
meeting of six states to make a decision to intervene in any one of ECOWAS’ 15 
states.
102 B Fagbayibo ‘Article 4(h): A supranational perspective’ in Kuwali & Viljoen (n 8) 
130.
103 The relative number of democratic regimes in a sub-region.
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With respect to the responsibility to prevent, ECOWAS has adopted 
a continuum of peace-building measures that range from those 
aimed at preventing social and political upheavals to those aimed 
at building the capacity of member states emerging from conflict.104 
These include involvement in preparation, organisation and 
supervision of elections in member states;105 observation of respect 
for human rights; as well as its active support for the development 
of democratic institutions.106 Most importantly, the establishment of 
a decentralised early warning system107 goes a long way in ensuring 
that ECOWAS has requisite prior information on potential triggers of 
conflict to enable it to provide timely assistance to member states in 
addressing the root causes of conflict. 
Where the above fails, leading to conflict, ECOWAS is mandatorily 
required to intervene.108 For a start, the ECOWAS Prevention 
Framework provides an elaborate and comprehensive mechanism 
for peaceful intervention through diverse preventive diplomacy 
initiatives.109 Where pacific means fail, the mechanism for military 
intervention may be initiated by a decision of either the ECOWAS 
Authority or the MSC; on the initiative of the president of the 
ECOWAS Commission; or at the request of either a member state, 
the AU or the UN.110 
Lastly, the ECOWAS mechanism makes explicit provision for the 
rebuilding and reconstruction of its member states after interventions. 
In this regard, ECOWAS requires all its financial institutions to develop 
policies to facilitate funding for reintegration and reconstruction 
programmes.111 It further undertakes to supervise and monitor cease-
fires through its observation missions;112 to implement disarmament, 
demobilisation and reintegration programmes; as well as to resettle 
and reintegrate refugees and internally-displaced persons.113
It is worth noting, however, that while the ECOWAS framework 
largely commends itself to aspects of the R2P concept, it diverts from 
the strict boundaries of the R2P norm in the sense that it envisions 
104 PEM (n 96) ch IX.
105 PEM art 42; Protocol on Democracy art 12.
106 PEM (n 96) art 31.
107 PEM arts 23 & 24.
108 PEM art 40.
109 2008 ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (Prevention Framework) para 1; 
Revised Treaty art 77(2)(iv) & (v) 
110 PEM (n 96) arts 25 & 26.
111 PEM art 42.
112 PEM art 31.
113 PEM art 44.
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a wide scope of situations warranting intervention and fails to make 
military intervention subject to the prior authorisation of the UN. 
Nevertheless, ECOWAS acknowledges that although it acts on the 
basis of the sub-region’s realities, it constitutes a building block and 
an integral part of the continental and global security architecture, 
and thus needs to work in partnership and in cooperation with 
the AU and the UN.114 For this reason, article 52 of the Protocol 
to the ECOWAS Mechanism requires ECOWAS to inform the UN of 
any military intervention undertaken.115 Additionally, the ECOWAS 
Mechanism consistently requires cooperation between ECOWAS, the 
AU and the UN mechanisms116 and goes to the extent of allowing the 
AU and UN to initiate the ECOWAS mechanism.117 This is a critical 
feature for any sub-regional enforcement actions under R2P. 
4.2 ECOWAS’ involvement in R2P-related cases
Since inception, ECOWAS has undertaken various successful 
interventions. This article focuses on interventions in The Gambia, 
Côte d’Ivoire and Mali. The focus in each of the cases is on events 
and steps taken in respect of the responsibility to react under R2P.
4.2.1 ECOWAS intervention in The Gambia (2016/2017)
The situation in The Gambia involved a contested presidential 
election in which the incumbent had rejected the results that had 
declared the opposition candidate the winner.118 This was despite 
the fact that ECOWAS, the AU and the UN had issued a joint 
statement declaring the elections as having been free and fair.119 This 
led to a political stand-off that saw Gambian refugees as well as the 
opposition candidate flee to neighbouring Senegal.120
114 Prevention Framework paras 117 & 118.
115 Sarkin (n 45) 26: Sarkin argues that in practice there may be consultation and 
unilateral action by ECOWAS may only occur where there is no agreement. 
Notwithstanding this, the fact that the obligation is to inform rather than to seek 
prior authorisation means that ECOWAS can resort to the use of force in the 
absence of UNSC approval. 
116 PEM (n 96) arts 41(b) & 52; Revised Treaty art 83.
117 PEM art 26.
118 T Gouegnon ‘Yahya Jammeh loses to Adama Barrow in Gambia election’ (2016), 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/12/gambia-yahya-jammeh-loses-
election-adama-barrow-161202130519550.html (accessed 8 July 2020).
119 ‘ECOWAS, AU and UN statement on the Gambian December 1 presidential 
election’, http://www.ecowas.int/ecowas-african-union-and-un-statement-on-
the-gambian-december-1-presidential-election/ (accessed 8 July 2019).
120 C Hartmann ‘ECOWAS and the restoration of democracy in The Gambia’ (2017) 
52 Africa Spectrum 87 94.
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The AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) condemned the 
incumbent’s actions, stressed the imperative of dialogue and 
expressed the AU’s determination to take all necessary measures 
to ensure that the will of the Gambian people as expressed in the 
elections was respected.121 It also acknowledged and expressed 
support for the efforts that were being made by ECOWAS.122 The 
ECOWAS Authority also issued a Communiqué in the same terms as 
the AU and requested the AU and UN’s endorsement of its decisions 
as well as technical assistance in mediating the conflict.123 This was 
followed by a statement by the president of the UNSC recognising 
the president-elect and commending the efforts being undertaken 
by ECOWAS and the AU to reach a peaceful solution.124
In an attempt to secure pacific settlement, ECOWAS dispatched 
a high-level mission of heads of state, accompanied by the Special 
Representative of the UNSG for West Africa to attempt to reach a 
political solution.125 No concession, however, was reached.126 
On the side-lines of the negotiations, ECOWAS was engaged 
in a contingency plan that involved the gathering of sub-regional 
troops in Senegal under the banner of the ECOWAS Mission in The 
Gambia (ECOMIG) in readiness to move into The Gambia should 
the situation so demand.127 The mission’s objective was to create 
an enabling environment for the enforcement of the election results 
and to ensure the safety of the population in the process.128 
In the meantime, in line with the decision of ECOWAS to seek 
the endorsement of the UN, Senegal (an ECOWAS and UNSC 
member at the time) drafted and presented a resolution to the 
UNSC for approval to use all means necessary to restore order in 
The Gambia.129 However, the unanimous resolution adopted by the 
UNSC only passively welcomed the ECOWAS decision to intervene 
121 AU ‘Communiqué of the Peace and Security Council’s 644th meeting held on 
12 December 2016 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia’ 3. 
122 As above.
123 ECOWAS ‘Final communiqué of the fiftieth ordinary session of the ECOWAS 
Authority of Heads of State and Government held on 17 December 2016’.
124 UN ‘Security Council statement says Gambian leaders must respect vote result, 
ensure peaceful transfer of power to president-elect’ (2016), https://www.
un.org/press/en/2016/sc12650.doc.htm (accessed 8 July 2019).
125 ECOWAS (n 123) 7.
126 As above.
127 The Presidency, Republic of Ghana ‘Press release: Ghana deploys troops to 
support ECOWAS Mission in The Gambia’ (2017), http://presidency.gov.gh/
index.php/2017/01/18/ghana-deploys-troops-to-support-ecowas-mission-in-
the-gambia/ (accessed 8 July 2019).
128 As above.
129 What’s in blue ‘Resolution on The Gambia’ (2017), http://www.whatsinblue.
org/2017/01/resolution-on-the-gambia.php (accessed 8 July 2019).
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but expressed its ‘full support to ECOWAS in its commitment to 
ensure, by political means first, respect of the will of the people of The 
Gambia’.130 Notably, the UNSC fell short of authorising the use of 
‘all means necessary’, 131 failed to issue the resolution under chapter 
VII of the UN Charter and did not declare the situation a threat to 
international peace and security, thereby creating uncertainty as to 
the basis upon which it was exercising its authority over the internal 
conflict.132 
Shortly after the resolution had been passed the ECOWAS troops 
crossed the border into The Gambia, leading to a political settlement 
for the relinquishing of power.133 This was done notwithstanding the 
failure by the UNSC to authorise the use of military force and its 
insistence on the use of political means (first). The UNSC’s resolution, 
therefore, arguably served as a legitimising tool rather than dictating 
action by ECOWAS. 
Although it may be argued, from a human security perspective, 
that the ECOWAS intervention pre-empted a foreseeable lapse into 
conflict and the potential commission of atrocity crimes (earlier 
expressed by the UNSG Special Adviser on the Prevention of 
Genocide following statements that incited ethnic violence by the 
incumbent),134 the intervention falls short of compliance with the 
R2P norm’s procedural standards. This is because the intervention 
was largely aimed at enforcing democratic ideals and the military 
deployment was not specifically authorised by the UNSC. Although 
it has been argued that the UNSC did not specifically prohibit 
military intervention and that the loose but strategic wording of 
the resolution that emphasised a solution ‘by political means first’, 
indirectly expressed support for the possibility of a military solution,135 
130 UNSC Resolution 2337.
131 UN ‘Provisional record of the Security Council 7866th meeting of 19 January 
2017: Peace consolidation in West Africa’ (2017): Comments made by some 
UNSC member states after the passing of the resolution specifically made it clear 
that the approval was not an authorisation for the use of force.
132 C Kreß & B Nußberger ‘Pro-democratic intervention in current international law: 
The case of The Gambia in January 2017’ (2017) 4 Journal on the Use of Force and 
International Law 242.
133 P Williams ‘A new African model of coercion? Assessing the ECOWAS mission 
in The Gambia’ (2017), https://theglobalobservatory.org/2017/03/ecowas-
gambia-barrow-jammeh-african-union/ (accessed 8 July 2019); Office of the 
Spokesperson for the UNSG ‘Note to Correspondents - Joint declaration on the 
political situation in The Gambia’ (2017), https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/
note-correspondents/2017-01-21/note-correspondents-joint-declaration-
political-situation (accessed 8 July 2019).
134 M Nouma ‘Note to correspondents – Statement by Special Adviser on the 
Prevention of Genocide’ (2016), https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/note-
correspondents/2016-06-10/note-correspondents-statement-special-adviser-
prevention (accessed 27 August 2019).
135 Kreß & Nußberger (n 132) 244.
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it is only when viewed from the eyes of the broader R2P concept that 
the attributes above may be argued as falling within the ambit of 
R2P. 
The fact that Senegal was at the forefront of the intervention in 
The Gambia has been argued as having been motivated by political 
ends136 more than the need to enforce any normative ideals.137 Worth 
noting, however, is the strategic location of Senegal which encloses 
The Gambia within its territory; the fact that over 45 000 refugees 
had already entered Senegal; and the fact that Senegal was the only 
West-African country in the UNSC, which informed Senegal’s lead 
role.138 Even so, the fact that the decision to intervene was taken 
collectively at the sub-regional level went a long way in sheltering 
The Gambia from any negative impacts of any self-interest on the 
part of Senegal.139 However, such self-interest arguably is imperative 
in the successful implementation of R2P when channelled along 
objectively-identifiable legal grounds for action coupled with a 
multilateral decision-making system.  
The ECOWAS intervention in The Gambia goes to show that sub-
regional organisations are better placed to act in a timely and decisive 
manner to ensure peace where coercive means are necessary and 
where the UNSC is reluctant or does not regard such situations as 
commending themselves to coercive measures. 
4.2.2 ECOWAS intervention in Côte d’Ivoire (2011)
Côte d’Ivoire had since 2002 endured a longstanding civil war 
between its southern and northern regions. The conflict that informed 
this intervention erupted after the incumbent President, Laurent 
Gbagbo (Gbagbo) rejected the results of the 2010 presidential 
elections in which Alassane Ouattara (Ouattara) was declared the 
winner.140 Gbagbo contested the results before the Constitutional 
Council alleging fraud in departments in the northern region.141 The 
Council, which was supportive of Gbagbo, annulled results from 
136 Williams (n 133); Hartmann (n 120) 94. These include the failure of the 
‘Senegambia’ confederation talks with The Gambia and the incumbent’s 
longstanding support for separatist movements in Southern Senegal’s 
Casamance region.
137 Williams (n 133).
138  http://www.un.org/en/sc/members/elected.asp (accessed 8 July 2019).
139 F Mugisha & G Mittawa ‘Multilateral intervention: The AMISOM experience’ in 
Kuwali & Viljoen (n 8) 266.
140 X Rice ‘Conflict looms over Ivory Coast while poll-loser Gbagbo refuses to cede 
control’ (2010),  https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/dec/06/ivory-
coast-election-stalemate-gbagbo (accessed 8 July 2019). 
141 ECOWAS ‘Final communiqué on the Extraordinary Session of the Authority of 
Heads of State and Government on Côte d’Ivoire (7 December 2010)’.
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seven northern departments and proceeded to declare Gbagbo the 
winner.142 Two separate inaugurations took place, for Gbagbo in the 
south and for Ouattara in the north, resulting in a political impasse 
marred by acts of violence.143 
ECOWAS and the AU endorsed the election results as declared 
by the electoral commission, recognising Ouattara as the legitimate 
President-elect and called on Gbagbo to respect the will of the 
people and to yield power.144 They both proceeded to impose 
sanctions on Côte d’Ivoire.145 The UNSC welcomed these decisions 
and expressed support for the efforts in promoting dialogue.146 It 
moreover reiterated the readiness of the UNSC to impose targeted 
sanctions to all obstructing the peace process or committing serious 
violations of human rights.147
In an attempt to arrive at a peaceful resolution, ECOWAS and 
the AU undertook separate mediation efforts with both failing to 
procure a truce.148 ECOWAS proceeded to threaten to use ‘legitimate 
force’ in a bid to force a settlement.149 However, this decision was 
contradicted by that taken by the AU’s PSC a month later calling for 
a peaceful resolution and putting in place its own high-level panel to 
pursue a political solution.150 This only served to further the existing 
impasse.151
Presented with the above conflicting positions, the UN chose to 
downplay the position of ECOWAS by only taking note of it while 
emphasising the AU’s political approach.152 Pursuant to this, ECOWAS 
recalled its resolutions and instead appealed to the UNSC to impose 
stiffer targeted sanctions and to also strengthen the mandate of UN 
142 J James ‘Ivory Coast poll overturned: Gbagbo declared winner’ (2010), http://
www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-11913832 (accessed 8 July 2019).
143 BBC ‘Ivory Coast crisis as presidential rivals both sworn in’ (2010), http://www.
bbc.com/news/world-africa-11919256 (accessed 8 July 2019).
144 AU ‘Communiqué of the AU PSC of its 252nd meeting held on 9 December 
2010’; ECOWAS (n 141).
145 As above.
146 UN ‘Security Council press statement on Côte d’Ivoire’ (2010), https://www.
un.org/press/en/2010/sc10105.doc.htm (accessed 8 July 2019).
147 As above.
148 ECOWAS (n 141); ECOWAS ‘Final communiqué of the Extraordinary Session 
of the Authority of Heads of State and Government on Côte d’Ivoire held on 
24 December 2010’ paras 10-11; UN ‘Côte d’Ivoire chronology of events : 
Security Council report’ (2017)’.
149 As above.
150 AU ‘Communiqué of the AU PSC of its 259th meeting held on 28 January 2011’; 
Marusa (n 28) 30.
151 E Abatan & Y Spies ‘African solutions to African problems? The AU, R2P and Côte 
d’Ivoire’ (2016) South African Journal of International Affairs 4.
152 UNSC Resolution 1975.
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Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI)153 to enable them use all means 
necessary to protect civilians.154 
The UNSC proceeded to impose an arms embargo on Côte d’Ivoire 
as well as targeted sanctions against Gbagbo and his associates.155 
The UNSC also extended its prior authorisation to UNOCI (and the 
supporting French forces) to use all means necessary to protect 
civilians.156 The duo intervened using force, with the assistance of 
pro-Ouattara fighters, leading to the surrender of Gbagbo.157  
In addition to the above measures, it is argued that the adoption 
and use of the CFA franc and the use of a single central bank among 
ECOWAS member states made it easy for ECOWAS to impose 
sanctions on Gbagbo’s government.158 
The fact that special advisers to the UNSG on genocide and R2P 
had expressed concern over ‘the possibility of genocide, crimes 
against humanity, war crimes and ethnic cleansing in Côte d’Ivoire’159 
placed the conflict under R2P, thus necessitating international action. 
The UNSC declared the situation a threat to regional peace and 
security and called for action under chapter VII of the UN Charter 
in its authorisation of intervention by the UNOCI.160 Although the 
conflict also sought to enforce democracy, the overwhelming human 
security concerns justified intervention even though the UNSC fell 
short of directly invoking R2P.  
However, it is argued that the proactiveness of the UN was not 
entirely altruistic but was driven by French interests.161 France, the 
former colonial power of Côte d’Ivoire and a permanent member 
of the UNSC, is argued to have had a regime-change agenda given 
Gbagbo’s stand for the economic interests of his country162 and, 
153 UNSC Resolution 1933: UNOCI had been deployed by the UN after the 2002 
Ivorian conflict as a peacekeeping force in Côte d’Ivoire and was supported by 
French forces.
154 UN (n 148). 
155 UNSC Resolution 1975.
156 UNSC Resolution 1975 para 6.
157 UN (n 148). 
158 K Chitiyo ‘Ivory Coast: Africa’s democracy lesson’ (2011), http://www.bbc.com/
news/world-africa-13092437 (accessed 12 October 2019).
159 F Deng & E Luck ‘Statement attributed to the UN Secretary-General’s special 
advisers on the prevention of genocide and the responsibility to protect on the 
situation in Côte d’Ivoire’ (2011), https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/
documents/media/statements/2011/English/2011-01-19-OSAPG,%20
Special%20Advisers%20Statement%20on%20Cote%20d’Ivoire,%2019%20
Jan%202011.pdf  (accessed 10 October 2019).
160 UNSC Resolutions 1933, 1967 & 1975.
161 Abatan & Spies (n 151) 6.
162 A Little ‘Q&A: Ivory Coast crisis’ (2011), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
africa-11916590 (accessed 12 October 2019).
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further, given France’s interest in re-establishing French influence 
in Francophone Africa.163 Although Bellamy and Williams argue that 
‘regional arrangements played a crucial “gatekeeping” role in defining 
the problem and terms of engagement’,164 this is not entirely correct. 
Statements made by ECOWAS and the AU only provided a pretext 
for UN action. There is no record of any consultation by the UN with 
either the AU or ECOWAS in determining the terms of engagement 
in the conflict. France’s undue influence in the decision to intervene 
and the execution of the intervention, therefore, overshadowed the 
UN’s impartiality while dwarfing any role by ECOWAS or the AU.165
Additionally, ‘the lack of unity of response, duplication of efforts’ 
and the AU’s contradiction of the position adopted by ECOWAS 
undermined their effectiveness in resolving the conflict at the 
regional level, thus necessitating the UN’s involvement.166 However, 
it is worth noting that while ECOWAS gave room for the participation 
of a representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission in all 
its meetings on Côte d’Ivoire,167 the AU failed to reciprocate this. 
Arguably, therefore, the AU’s failure to coordinate its response with 
ECOWAS undermined the leadership role of ECOWAS and its ability 
to achieve a timely and amicable settlement. 
This intervention contributes numerous lessons while equally 
bringing to fore challenges associated with sub-regional intervention. 
The first is the demonstration that sub-regional organisations are in 
a better position to enforce targeted sanctions as seen from the UN’s 
request to ECOWAS members to help enforce its sanctions.168 Second, 
joint sub-regional entities such as a sub-regional currency and a central 
bank are instrumental in the enforcement of targeted economic 
sanctions. Lastly, there is a need for closer cooperation between sub-
regional and regional organisations in the implementation of R2P to 
ensure the adoption of concerted measures that will enjoy greater 
international legitimacy and have a better chance of achieving timely 
settlements of R2P-related conflicts.169 In this regard, the principle 
of subsidiarity is recommended in the hierarchical sequencing of 
163 B Plett ‘Did UN forces take sides in Ivory Coast?’ (2011), http://www.bbc.com/
news/world-africa-13004462 (accessed 12 October 2019).
164 Bellamy & Williams (n 65) 837. 
165 As above.
166 Abatan & Spies (n 151) 5; K Striebinger ‘Coordination between the African 
Union and the regional economic communities’ (2016) 14.
167 See all the communiqués of the ECOWAS Authority above.
168 UNSC Resolution 2045 para 8.
169 Arthur (n 81) 15; Alao (n 61) 29.
(2021) 21 AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW JOURNAL358
interventions with sub-regional organisations acting first and resort 
to the UN as a last call.170 
4.2.3 ECOWAS intervention in Mali (2012)
The conflict in Mali presents what R2P envisions as a situation 
where a state is unable to discharge its responsibility to protect. The 
conflict began as a push/rebellion by civilian separatist movements 
in Northern Mali for self-determination but was later replaced by 
Islamic extremism and the commission of war crimes by Islamist 
rebel groups that took control of the region.171 The inability of the 
Malian government to effectively combat the rebellion led to mutiny 
and a coup against President Amadou Toure prompting the UNSC 
and ECOWAS to respond to the crisis. 
ECOWAS committed to taking all necessary measures to 
guarantee the protection of affected populations and to assist Mali 
in safeguarding its sovereignty and territorial integrity.172 In this 
regard, it succeeded in negotiating with the military junta for the 
restoration of constitutional order and the installation of an interim 
civilian government. It achieved this through a mix of negotiation 
through a high-level delegation173 and the threat of general political/
diplomatic, economic and financial sanctions against the Mali state 
as well as through individual sanctions against the military junta’s 
leaders.174 This, therefore, provided room to focus on the insurgence 
by rebels.
Despite efforts by ECOWAS at mediating the rebellion, the 
insurgence could not be contained. ECOWAS, therefore, resolved to 
adopt a military solution of deploying troops to Mali under the banner 
of ‘ECOWAS Mission in Mali’ (MICEMA).175 Although this decision 
received the endorsement of the AU,176 various stakeholders in the 
170 Striebinger (n 167) 17; K Aning & S Atuobi ‘Application of and responses to the 
responsibility to protect norm at the regional and sub-regional levels in Africa: 
Lessons for implementation’ in The Stanley Foundation (ed) The role of regional 
and sub-regional arrangements in strengthening the responsibility to protect (2011) 
13.
171 Human Rights Council, ‘Situation of human rights in the Republic of Mali’ (3 July 
2012) para 2 read with art 8 of the Rome Statute; UNSC Resolution 2085.
172 ECOWAS ‘Final Communiqué – 40th ordinary session of the Authority of Heads 
of State and Government’ (16-17 February 2012) para 14; ECOWAS ‘ECOWAS 
statement on the situation in the North of Mali’ (19 March 2012).
173 ECOWAS ‘Final Communiqué from the extraordinary summit of ECOWAS Heads 
of State and Government’ (27 March 2012) para 14.
174 ECOWAS ‘Communiqué – Emergency mini-summit of ECOWAS Heads of State 
and Government on the situation in Mali’ (29 March 2012).
175 See ECOWAS Summit Communiqués of 26 April 2012 (para 21); 3 May 2012 
(para 13) and 28-29 June 2012 (para 25).
176 AU ‘Communiqué of the PSC 316th Meeting’ (3 April 2012).
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region were opposed to a military solution, key among them being 
Mali’s interim leadership.177 Other core countries, such as Algeria and 
Mauritania, are also reported to have been opposed to the decision.178 
This, when coupled with the fact that the Islamic militants had 
extensive military experience and sophisticated equipment, dealt a 
blow to the ability of ECOWAS to muster sufficient political, military 
and financial capacity to go through with the deployment. ECOWAS, 
therefore, was compelled to seek UNSC’s authorisation and support 
for an international force to intervene in Mali.179 
The UNSC, however, was reluctant to approve the use of force 
despite the decision having received the AU’s endorsement and 
despite the UN having been part of all ECOWAS meetings leading up 
to the decision to intervene militarily. This was also despite receiving 
a direct request from Mali’s interim leadership for intervention.180 
Having received the request by ECOWAS in June,181 the UNSC 
delayed the approval until December under the bureaucratic 
pretext of requiring ‘additional information’ from ECOWAS and 
the AU.182 Even when the UNSC finally authorised intervention 
through an Africa-led Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA), it withheld 
the provision of logistical and financial support, only expressing its 
‘intention to consider’ providing the support upon being furnished 
with additional implementation details.183 In the end, what was 
authorised was an ‘unfunded’ and logistically-unsupported mission 
to Mali, thus lending credence to the view that ‘AFISMA had clearly 
been set up to fail’.184 A donors’ conference had to be held by the AU 
and ECOWAS for contributions towards the Mission.185 The lack of 
177 D Francis ‘The regional impact of the armed conflict and French intervention in 
Mali’ (2013) NOREF Report 7-8.
178 Although not ECOWAS members, both countries were strategic to the resolution 
of the conflict given their influence over the northern part of Mali as well as their 
interest in the spill-over effect in the form of returning extremists. See W Lacher 
‘The Malian crisis and the challenge of regional security cooperation’ (2013) 2 
International Journal of Security and Development 3.
179 ECOWAS ‘Communiqué of the ECOWAS Commission on the situation in Mali’ 
(7 June 2012) para 7.
180 UNSC Resolution 2071.
181 AU ‘Communiqué – Peace and Security Council 323rd Meeting’ (12 June 2012) 
para 16.
182 UNSC ‘Security Council Press Statement on Mali’ (18 June 2012); UNSC 
Resolution 2056 para 18; UNSC ‘Security Council press statement on Mali’ 
(10 August 2012); UNSC Resolution 2071 para 6. 
183 UNSC Resolution 2085 para 21; Compare this to the nature of logistical and 
financial support provided to the UN’s own mission (MINUSMA) established to 
succeed AFISMA. See, eg, paras 7, 10, 12, 13, 14 & 15 of UNSC’s Resolution 
2100. 
184 A Oluwadare ‘The African Union and the conflict in Mali: Extra-regional influence 
and the limitations of a regional actor’ (2014) 3 African Journal of Governance and 
Development 18; UNSC ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali’ 
(26 March 2013) para 46. 
185 ECOWAS ‘Final Communiqué Extraordinary Session of the Authority of ECOWAS 
Heads of State and Government’ (19 January 2013) paras 20-21.
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unqualified support from the UNSC from inception hence impacted 
the deployment and effectiveness of AFISMA. 
Following the deepening of the insurgence due to the delays in 
the approval and deployment of AFISMA, Mali’s interim leadership 
was compelled to seek France’s military assistance.186 The French-led 
offensive against the rebellion, with subsequent assistance from the 
AFISMA troops, saw an end to the insurgence and gave room for the 
establishment of a stabilisation mission. 
While the Mali case highlights the timely quality of sub-regional 
intervention as well as the importance of regional organisations 
deferring to the leadership of sub-regional organisations, as 
demonstrated by the AU’s consistent support for and endorsement of 
ECOWAS measures, it also reveals challenges of multilateral military 
action in the context of the strict limits of the R2P norm. Some of the 
lessons it holds for sub-regional intervention include the following:
(i) Financial capacity is crucial for military intervention, hence 
there is a need for sub-regional organisations to focus on and 
strengthen their individual capacity to finance their missions.
(ii) Sub-regional organisations need to have a clear financing 
framework where a military operation is beyond both their 
military/logistical and financial capacity.
The resolution of the Mali conflict is argued as being an archetypal 
R2P norm implementation case with respect to obtaining the UNSC’s 
prior authorisation before the deployment of military force.187 While 
the ‘Mali case’ allows for action, especially in instances where sub-
regional organisations are lacking in capacity to intervene on their 
own, its effectiveness will require a clear framework regulating 
how the UNSC should handle requests received from sub-regional 
organisations for approval of military intervention, for human 
protection purposes. The framework should detail, among other 
things, the specific roles and obligations of each of the multilateral 
actors in executing the specific intervention. This will ensure certainty 
in the process and facilitate timely action. 
5 Conclusion  
Human security sits at the core of R2P (the R2P concept). For this 
reason, the concept prized the protection of populations at risk over 
any procedural bureaucracies based on the world order as it existed 
186 M Caparini ‘The Mali crisis and responses by regional actors’ (2015) Working 
Paper Norwegian Institute of International Affairs 9-10.
187 Nkrumah & Viljoen (n 8) 262 345; UNSC Resolution 2085 para 17.
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in 1945 at the adoption of the Charter of the UN. The realities of the 
post-Cold War era organisation of states highlight an increasing role 
for regional and, even more so, sub-regional organisations in the 
maintenance of sub-regional peace and security. This underscored 
the recommendation by ICISS to confer authority on regional and 
sub-regional organisations to adopt coercive measures under R2P. 
The recommendation, however, was omitted under the R2P norm 
in favour of the continued preservation of the special privileges 
of hegemony held by a few states, more so, the permanent veto-
bearing members of the UNSC and protected under the UN Charter. 
The result has been the perpetuation of an inherently unequal 
international security system where a few states have the exclusive 
privilege of deciding when another state ceases to benefit from the 
protection afforded by principles of sovereign equality and non-
interference under the pretext of R2P. This has given leeway for the 
use of R2P to mask ulterior motives for intervention as well as for the 
obstruction of decisive action in situations meriting the invocation 
of R2P based on the geopolitical and strategic interests of the few 
states rather than the imperative of human security. The former 
was the case in NATO’s UNSC-sanctioned intervention in Libya 
while the latter has been demonstrated by Russia’s more than nine 
vetoes against attempts by the UNSC to adopt coercive measures in 
Syria’s years-long conflict.188 Proposals for constructive abstention, 
resort to UNGA’s Uniting for Peace procedures and proposals for a 
‘responsibility not to veto’ have fallen flat, thus necessitating better 
democratised and human security-focused alternatives. The role of 
sub-regional organisations in this regard therefore is key and can no 
longer be ignored or downplayed.
As demonstrated by intervention actions undertaken under 
ECOWAS and discussed herein, sub-regional organisations possess 
unique comparative advantages over regional and international actors 
which make their enhanced involvement (including the adoption of 
coercive measures) central to effective R2P implementation. While 
the R2P concept acknowledges this, the R2P norm does not. 
Fortunately, the R2P norm lacks normative prescription. As an 
emerging norm, therefore, R2P is subject to the rigours of normative 
contestation and change that are attendant to the norm cascade 
stage where R2P currently finds itself. As part of the norm localisation 
process, therefore, R2P is compelled to seek congruence with 
188 The Guardian ‘Russia uses veto to end UN investigation of Syria chemical attacks’ 
(2019), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/24/russia-uses-veto-
end-un-investigation-chemical-attacks (accessed 29 October 2019).
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domestic cognitive priors, key among them being the practice of 
the sub-regional use of coercive measures for human protection 
purposes. 
The need for international legitimacy of sub-regional intervention, 
however, demands that norm localisation goes an extra step to 
produce bottom-up feedback (normative repatriation) that will 
lead to the modification of R2P at the international level189 to make 
provision for the authority of sub-regional organisations to adopt 
coercive measures under R2P. In this respect, therefore, international 
norm creation and implementation ceases to be a top-down one-way 
street process190 and embraces a dynamic norm diffusion process 
that allows room for norm localisation and repatriation rather than 
proselytism and the supplanting of domestic cognitive priors. Only 
such a process can guarantee the successful development of R2P into 
a prescriptive international norm while ensuring its legitimacy, local 
appropriateness, stability and endurance.191
In the meantime, the red-light interpretation of the need for 
the UNSC’s approval coupled with the imperative of ensuring the 
legitimacy of interventions provide a basis for sub-regional adoption 
of coercive measures under R2P. This, however, needs to be tempered 
with a close cooperation between sub-regional organisations, regional 
organisations as well as the UN to guarantee objectivity in decision 
making. Such cooperation, however, should be based on sovereign 
equality, capacity sharing and will as well as requiring the UNSC’s 
subsequent ratification, albeit until sub-regional coercive authority is 
officially adopted as part of the R2P norm at the international level.
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